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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTHCREST, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
\V ALI(ER BANI~ & TRUST C01I-
p ANY, a corporation, ·as executor 
of the last will and testament and 
estate of LUCIE R. THOMAS, who 
was sometimes known as L. R. 
THO:NIAS, deceased; JOHN LIV-
INGSTON THOMAS and ADE-
LAIDE R. TH01IAS, his wife; 
and GERTRUDE THOMAS 
GARDNER, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR, unmar-
ried; WALTER WRIGHT; and 
H. C. BROWNLEE, Trustee, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7735 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Quiet title action by N orthcrest, Inc., a Salt Lake 
real estate company. 
The lands are two adjoining tracts, roughly 40 acres 
each, located on the North Bench of Salt Lake City. 
(Title to some, but not all, of a number of platted lots in 
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2 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
the Southwest corner of the West 40 acre tract was 
stipulated and adjudged in Northcrest. The other lots, 
however, were litigated and were adjudicated the same 
as the main tracts. See map Exhibit A.) 
Principal defendants were a brother and sister, John 
Livingston Thomas (and wife), who lives in New York 
City, and Gertrude Thomas Gardner, who lives in the 
Virgin Islands. (Tr. 4). A defendant also was their 
unmarried younger brother, Hugh L. Thomas, Jr., Salt 
Lake City. He had received $3,200.00 from Northcrest 
for a deed to the lands. (Tr. 78). Also defendant was 
Walker Bank and Trust Company, their mother's execu-
tor. She was Lucie R. (L. R.) Thomas. She was the 
former owner. All parties who claim title claim through 
her as the common source. 
As stated, Hugh, Jr., the younger brother, received 
$3,200.00 from N orthcrest for a warranty deed from 
himself to that company. That deed was dated June 11, 
1948. (Exhibit C). He had held an earlier deed from his 
mother, Lucie, to him dated and recorded the year before, 
September 16 and December 11, 1947. (Exhibit B). 
Hugh's brother and sister learned he had sold. They 
were wroth. They claimed the mother's deed to him was 
spurious (not being in her own signature). They claimed 
she had not conveyed but had died owning title and that 
Hugh's deed-after their mother's death-therefore con-
veyed only his one-third share as her devisee-no more. 
(John, Gertrude and Hugh, Jr. were her only children 
and sole heirs and devisees in equal shares.) 
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\VALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY 3 
Beleaguered by kin and purchaser both, young Hugh 
wanted no part of this suit. So he defaulted. (Two 
others, formal parties only-not important here-did 
not defend, defendants \V right and Brownlee.) 
The trial proceeded. X orthcrest was opposed by 
John, Gertrude and their mother's executor. 
But, by then Northcrest did not rest on Hugh's title 
alone. By then it had become able to trace title back to 
the mother in two other ways besides: (1) through an 
early recorded deed by her to Utah Savings & Trust Com-
pany and a recent one in turn from Utah Savings to it-
self, and, also, (2) through an old recorded deed to about 
half of the property (most of the West 40 acre tract) 
from mother Lucie to H. H. Hempstead and a deed from 
Hempstead's widow and decree against Hempstead's 
administrator to that half as well. (Manifestly, North-
crest in proving title could not be limited to evidence 
of ownership through one specific chain alone. A party 
may prove ownership by any means he can; and by as 
many alternate titles as he has. That postulate is, of 
course, implicit in the law. One alleging title in general 
terms-not by a specific chain-may prove "whatever 
title he has". State vs. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987.) 
But, the court fell into error as the trial progressed. 
It let Utah Savings & Trust Company give evidence that 
its old 1914 records would seem to indicate that they had 
held a warranty deed from Lucie only as security for a 
loan now repaid. Too, it heard evidence from the lips 
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4 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
of a notary public herself impeaching her solemn, official, 
recorded certificate thereon to the contrary, that Lucie 
had not in fact acknowledged the deed which bore her 
name and ran to her son, Hugh, the younger brother 
who had afterward sold to N orthcrest. And, it refused 
to honor, but entirely disregarded, even plaintiff's title 
to theW est half of the property which ran from Lucie-to-
Hempstead-to-Northcrest. In fact, the court refused to 
find upon the effect of the Hempstead title at all, its find-
ings only reciting some of the evidence relating thereto. 
And when the trial ended, the court decided (1) that 
the deed from Lucie to son, Hugh, was invalid, (2) that 
her warranty deed to Utah Savings & Trust Company 
was only a mortgage, not a deed absolute, ( 3) that Lucie 
had not conveyed to anyone at all but died owning the 
property (what about Hempstead's West 40 acres?), (4) 
that sons Hugh and John, and daughter, Gertrude, each 
took a third on their mother's death as her devisees, 
and, (5) Northcrest could have title only to Hugh's V3 
by his deed to them. 
The court then adjudicated the title accordingly: 
Northcrest ¥3, John ¥3, and Gertrude Y3, subject how-
ever, to probate of Lucie's estate and possession by her 
executor. (Tr. 113). This was error, as we shall see. 
The court should have awarded the entire fee to North-
crest, not just VJ. The judment, therefore, must be 
reversed. 
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WALKER BA~K & TRUST <..'01\IPAN¥ 5 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Northcrest's Title Through Utah Savings And Trust 
Company. 
1. The Evidence Failed To Establish The Deed From 
Hugh's ~!other (~\nd Father) To Utah Savings And 
Trust Company Was Intended As A Mortgage. 
2. The Evidence Was Wholly Insufficient To Establish 
The Bank's Deed As A Mortgage. 
3. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company 
Attempting To Prove The Deed A Mortgage Was 
Incompetent After It Had Conveyed To N orthcrest. 
Northcrest's Title Through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. 
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknow-
ledged The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent. 
2. Since the N" otary 's Evidence That Lucie Did Not 
Acknowledge The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incom-
petent And Insufficient, The Acknowledgment Stands. 
The Deed (Exhibit B) Survives. 
Northcrest's Title Through Hempsteads. 
1. N orthcrest Established Title To The West Forty 
Acre Tract Through H. H. Hempstead, Regardless 
Of Its Alternate Titles To Both Tracts. 
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6 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
ARGUMENT 
NORTHCREST'S TIT'LE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS 
AND TRUST COMPANY 
1. The Evidence Failed To Establish The Deed From Hugh's 
Mother (And Father) To Utah Savings & Trust Com-
pany Was Intended As A Mortgage. 
On this proposition, all else aside, we should be will-
ing to rest appellant's case. 
That a deed absolute on its face may be shown to 
be intended only as a mortgage, we cannot deny. It is 
too late. The rule is universal. Utah agrees. Coray vs. 
Roberts 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. Thornley L. L. Com-
pany vs. Gailey 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. Gibbons vs. 
Gibbons 103 Utah 266,135 P. 2d 105. 
The only question in every case is what did the 
parties intend; what was their intention. 
''Whether a deed absolute in form is to be 
taken as a mortgage depends on the intention of 
the parties at the time of its execution." 59 C. J. S. 
:Mortgages~ 36. 
The mutual intention of the parties must be proved. 
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages~ 132. This implies, both parties, 
grantor and grantee, must intend the deed to be a 
mortgage. 
''In order to convert a deed absolute in its 
terms into a mortgage it is necessary that the 
understanding and intention of both parties, 
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"' AL KER BANK & TRUST COMPANY 7 
grantee as well as grantor, to that effect be con-
current and the same.'' (Italics added) Id. 
Obviously, therefore, 
''A mere secret intention on the part of one 
of the parties, not disclosed or communicated to 
the other, will not have the effect of changing the 
character of the transaction. Still less will this 
result where the parties have directly contradic-
tory intentions.'' Id. 
The evidence here was fatally deficient. That of the 
grantee aside, the intention of the grantors was never 
shown; there was no evidence at all upon the subject of 
the grantors' intention; absolutely none. 
Northcrest claimed through Utah Savings and Trust 
Company. It proved a recorded deed to both 40 acre 
tracts (less the small area containing the platted lots) 
from Lucie R. Thomas and husband to Utah Savings & 
Trust Company in 1914. (Exhibit D). It was a warranty 
deed. It said so. And it contained full covenants of war-
ranty. It was upon its face a conveyance absolute. And, 
Utah Savings later conveyed to Northcrest in 1947. 
(Exhibit E). This deed to Northcrest was not disputed. 
It was received without objection. (Tr. 24.) 
The respondents claimed Utah Savings had no title 
to convey to N orthcrest. They tried to prove the deed to 
Utah Savings was really only a mortgage; ergo, Utah 
Savings had nothing to convey to Northcrest and, con-
sequently, N orthcrest got nothing by that chain. And so 
they called an officer of Utah Savings. E. R. McGee, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
Assistant Cashier. They questioned him (in 1951) about 
the deed to Utah Savings (in 1914) before he even worked 
at the bank. Obviously he knew nothing of the transac-
tion; he said so. (Tr. 66). But, obviously, too, he was 
called to try and prove nevertheless that the 1914 deed to 
the bank (Exhibit D) had been intended only as a mort-
gage. Remember, the intention of both parties, not just 
one, must be shown to prove a deed a mortgage. McGee's 
inability to prove that is self evident. To his credit, how-
ever, it must be said he did his best. But it wasn't enough. 
It just could not be proved. He did not testify to any-
thing about the grantor's intention at all. He couldn't. 
He produced some records of the bank. But they said 
nothing about the subject. It just wasn't there. (We claim 
he proved nothing about the intention of the grantee 
either in respect to this particular deed. The bank's 
record did not refer to any deed in particular. See Page 
21 infra.) 
McGee testified that the bank's old records showed a 
loan to the grantors, renewed twice afterward; that the 
bank's cards on the two renewals (white cards 6447 and 
7178 of Exhibit 8) indicated the bank had held a war-
ranty deed for security to ''part'' of Section 29 (but what 
part?) ; and that the loan and renewals had been paid. 
Of course, no deed from Utah Savings back to the grant-
ors was proved. Respondents lament that fact. 
If the deed before us (Exhibit D) could be assumed 
as the one referred to in the bank's card (and we submit 
it cannot, the possibility of an unrecorded one having 
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W.\LI{ER BA.'~H;: & TRUST COMPANY 9 
been given and handed back on payment of the loan must 
not be overlooked) what about intention of both parties, 
grantor and grantee thereto1 So that the court may have 
easy access to McGee's evidence, we reproduce it here in 
full. Note the entire lack of any evidence upon the inten-
tion of the grantors; not to mention the utter failure to 
identify the deed claimed to have been deposited as 
security. (Tr. 62.) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
Q. State your name, please. 
A. E. R. McGee. 
Q. What is your occupation, Mr. McGee? 
A. Assistant cashier, Utah Savings & Trust Company. 
Q. What are your duties as such 1 
A. Oh, handling personnel, making some loans, little 
auditing, and so forth. 
Q. Do you have access to the records of the Utah Sav-
ings & Trust Company? 
A. Ido. 
Q. I show you three cards, held together by an elastic 
band, which are marked as "Exhibit 8", and ask you 
if you know what those cards are. 
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10 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
A. These cards are loan liability records. 
Q. Of what~ 
A. Of Hugh L. and Lucie R. Thomas. 
Q. With whom~ 
A. With the Utah Savings & Trust Company. 
Q. Did you withdraw them from the records of that 
Company? 
A. I did. 
Q. Are those records of the Utah Savings & Trust 
company? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, the first card on which the exhibit markings 
are made, is a blue card; and in the right hand 
column is the date, "Nov. 13 13." What does that 
indicate¥ 
A. That indicates that this loan was made on November 
13,1913. 
Q. And opposite those figures is the figure "900". 
What does that indicate? 
A. That would indicate the amount of the loan, 90 day 
note. 
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WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY 11 
Q. Then immediately below the first date, it shows 
"10 14" I belieYe-no, it is a ditto mark-
A. 1-10-14. 
Q. 1-10-1-!. What does that indicate u? 
A. That would indicate on January 10, 1914 three hun-
dred dollars was paid on this nine hundred dollar 
loan, leaving a balance of six hundred dollars. 
Q. Mr. :McGee, does the record indicate whether or not 
the loan was secured at that time~ 
A. This record here does not indicate that the loan was 
secured at that time. 
Q. If you will take the next card in order, please. What 
does that indicate~ 
A. Well, this next card is dated January 12, 1914 and 
it is a renewal of this six hundred dollar balance on 
this first blue card ; but it was increased from $600.00 
to $1,400.00. 
Q. Then there is a subsequent date, October 15, 1914, 
and opposite that the figure "500". What does that 
indicate~ 
A. That would indicate a payment on the principal of 
$500.00, reducing the loan to $900.00. 
Q. Then "10-20-14", opposite that "900". What does 
that indicate? 
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12 NORTHCREST, INC. YS. 
A. Well, that indicates that the loan was due at that 
time, and renewed for the same amount, for $900.00. 
Q. Referring to this second card, January 12, 1914, does 
it indicate any security~ 
A. Apparently, in our security column on this liability 
card, it has "R. E. Warranty Deed-Part of Sec. 29 
Tp. 1 No. Range 1 E, S. L. Mer." 
~IR. THOMAS: At that point. I didn't anticipate 
that coming as quick as it did. I move to strike out 
the witness' answer in regard to the alleged security 
and description, and object to the same upon the 
ground it is incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant, 
and as constituting an attempt on the part of the 
Utah Savings & Trust Company, the grantor of this 
plaintiff, to furnish statements and declarations 
against its ownership, and against the title of the 
plaintiff after the Utah Savings & Trust Company 
has parted with title. 
THE COURT: They did so by Quit Claim Deed. 
That is in evidence. 
MR. THOMAS: That is right. Exhibit E. 
(Argument by counsel.) 
THE COURT: I am going to let you proceed. Objec-
tion overruled. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Will you give me the last 
question and answer. 
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WALKER BANK & Tl!l'ST COMPANY 
(Reporter read record.) 
MR. THO~IAS: Will you read the objection~ 
(Reporter read record.) 
13 
MR. THOMAS: I would like to add to that, if I may; 
it is also hearsay and not binding on the plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. (By ~Ir. Christensen) With respect to the third card, 
Mr. l\1cGee, the date of that is what~ 
A. Octo her 12, 1914. 
Q. And you say that was a renewal~ 
A. It indicates a renewal of this other card, referring to 
the particular note number, for $900.00. 
Q. Then the next line shows the date of 7-17-15; opposite 
that the :figure "450". What does that indicate~ 
A. That would indicate a payment on the principal on 
that date. 
Q. Then there is a subsequent entry of 11-3-15, an.d also 
opposite that "450". What does that indicate~ 
A. That would indicate that was $450.00, the balance on 
the loan at that time, and it was paid off. 
Q. So it indicates payment in full of the note; is that 
correct? 
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14 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Was there any interest in connection with this loan? 
A. Yes. It has 10 per cent on the first card. It was in-
creased to 12 per cent rate. And the last card was 
10 per cent rate. 
Q. Is there any place on the cards indicating payment 
of interest 1 
A. Yes. Each card indicates payment of interest on the 
back of the card, for various amounts, various 
payments. 
Q. The entries on the reverse side indicate the payments 
of interest 1 
A. Payments of interest on that particular loan. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: We offer in evidence De-
fendants' Exhibit 8. 
You may cross examine. 
MR. THOMAS: Are these three all one exhibit, 
Mr. Christensen 7 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. THOMAS: 
Q. Were you employed by the bank on the date of these 
documents, Exhibit 8, in 1914 and 1915! 
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A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You don't know anything a bout the transactions 
which they purport to represent, do you~ 
A. No, not those transactions. 
nlR. TH011AS: I object to them, your Honor, as 
incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay, 
and upon the grounds that the proper foundation 
has not been laid, and also upon the grounds they 
are an attempt on the part of the Utah Savings & 
Trust Company, the grantor of this plantiff to give 
evidence in disparagement of its own title to the 
property in question. That is, I assume they are 
offered for the purpose of showing the security 
transaction of the real estate involved here. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That is right. 
MR. THOMAS: I object to them on those grounds. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled, and the exhibit 
will be received. 
MR. THOMAS: Are you through~ 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
MR. THOMAS: That is all. 
(Witness excused.) 
McGee's testimony said nothing upon the subject of 
what the gra;ntors' intention was. And it was inadequate 
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in another and no less fatal respect besides: It did not 
identify the deed here (Exhibit D) as being the deed de-
posited for security. This suggested itself to counsel 
later, for after the trial had been recessed for several 
weeks and then renewed, respondent proved the deed 
in question (Exhibit D) was the only deed recorded in the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's office from Lucie R. 
Thomas and husband to Utah Savings. We objected. The 
court remarked that he could not see that the proof 
was material, but received it anyway. (Tr. 102). 
It must clearly appear that a deed absolute was in-
tended as a mortgage to make it such. And both parties 
must so intend. 
"It must appear to the court beyond all rea-
sonable controversy that it was the intention of 
not only one, but all, of the parties, that the deed 
should be a mortgage,' 'W ehle vs. Price, 202 Cal. 
394, 260 P. 878. 
Mutual intention is to be determined. 
''. . . The primary inquiry relates to the 
intention of the parties at the time the transaction 
was consummated. Mutual intent is to be deter-
mined ... " (Italics added) Umpqua Forest Indus-
tries vs. Neenah-Oregon Land Co., 188 Ore. 605, 
217 P. 2d 219. 
A deed absolute is presumed what it appears to be; 
both parties must intend otherwise to make it a mortgage. 
" ... the presumption of law is that the trans-
fer is what it appears to be and that he who would 
assert that it was given as a mortgage must so 
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show by clear and convincing evidence; and that 
the intent must be that of both parties and not 
merely of one party." Hoffman 1'S. Graaf, 179 
Wash. 431, 38 P. 2d 236. 
There was no proof that the warranty deed referred 
to on the bank's records was the one (Exhibit D) pro-
duced. But, if we were to assume that it was, McGee's 
testimony at its best can only be treated as evidence of 
the bank's (grantee's) intention to regard it as a mort-
gage. But that is not enough. Respondents here are in 
the predicament of the respondent who was reversed in 
Davis vs. Stewart, 4 Cal. App. 604, 88 P. 2d 734: 
"The respondent shows no more than that 
one of those who engaged in the transaction had 
the undisclosed intention to treat it differently. 
The rule is thus stated in 41 Cor. Jur., page 332: 
'But in order to convert a deed absolute in its 
terms into a mortgage it is necessary that the 
understanding and intention of both parties, 
grantee as well as grantor, to that effect be con-
current and the same '. '' 
Always, the evidence that a deed is a mortgage must 
be "clear", "unequivocal" and "satisfactory." Coray 
vs. Roberts 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. 
Thus to convert a deed into a mortgage the evidence 
(1) must show both parties so intended, and, (2) must be 
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory that they did. Here it 
was fatally wanting in both respects. There was no evi-
dence upon the subject of the grantors' intention; none 
whatever. But the court strained its findings to say both 
parties intended the deed to be a mortgage, declaring it 
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"was not intended by either the grantor or the grantee" 
as a deed absolute. (Tr. 110). But that was not the evi-
dence; at least, not as to the grantors. There was no evi-
dence that they intended any mortgage. Their deed is 
the only evidence of their intention. It said they convey-
ed, absolute. The court erred in finding contrary to their 
expressed intention that the deed was absolute. There 
is just no evidence to sustain that finding. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS 
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.) 
2. The Evidence Was Wholly Insufficient To Establish 
The Bank's Deed As A Mortgage. 
We haYe seen that to make a. deed a mortgage, both 
parties must so intend and that there was no evidence at 
all that the intention of the grantors was otherwise than 
the warranty deed to Utah Savings (Exhibit D) ex-
pressed. 
But the evidence was wholly insufficient besides. 
The deed said it was a conveyance absolute. And a deed 
fair upon its face is presumed to be exactly that-a deed 
absolute, 
'' ... and a party alleging that a deed, absolute 
and unconditional in form, was in effect a mort-
gage, must meet and overcome the presumption 
which the law raises from the face of the papers, 
namely, that the instrument is in legal effect just 
what is purports to be." 59 C. J. S. Mortgages 
§ 48. 
Evidence to prove a deed a mortgage is to be receiv-
ed with caution. 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages §134. 
More than a mere preponderance is required. Vari-
ously put, the evidence must be: 
'' ... clear, certain, plain, convincing, satis-
factory, unequivocal, unambigious and conclu-
sive.'' Id. § 134. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 NORTHCREST, INC. VS. 
This court has said it must at least be "clear, un-
equivocal and satisfactory." Garay vs. Roberts 82 Utah 
445, 25 p. 2d 940.1 
The general rule is that the evidence must not leave 
the nature of the transaction in reasonable doubt. 36 Am. 
Jur., Mortgages §135. The reason is easy. 
''The reason for the exaction of this high 
degree of proof is not far to seek. If a less rigor-
ous rule obtained, no man would be safe in taking 
a deed of property. When it had doubled or 
trebled in value it would only be necessary for the 
grantor to bring witnesses to testify to any agree-
ment that the deed was intended as a mortgage, 
to enable him, on payment of the purchase price 
and interest, to redeem." 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, 
§ 134. 
And the presumption that a deed is a deed, not a 
mortgage, grows and grows by lapse of time. 59 C. J. S. 
Mortgages, § 48. 
Tested by the foregoing principles and rules, the 
evidence was wholly insufficient to make this deed a mort-
gage. There was not only a total failure of proof as to 
the grantors' intention. The evidence was all a failure. 
First. There was no evidence offered or suggested 
about any deed being a security except a meagre two-line 
memo penned on the bank's two white cards relating to 
the two renewals of the original loan. The first card 
1lt now says "clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive." Thornley 
Land & Livestock Co. vs. Gailey 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. 
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relating to the original loan was a blue one. (These 
three cards make up defendants' Exhibit 8.) It was 
not claimed the original loan was secured at all. 
That was five months before this deed (Exhibit D) was 
ever made. But the two renewal cards (the white ones) 
bear the following iThich is all the evidence, and the only 
evidence, at all about security: 
''Security 
R. E. TVarranty Deed 
''Description of Property 
Part of Sec. 29 Tp. 1 No 
Range 1 E, S. L. Mer" 
(Italics indicate handwriting.) 
Second. This meagre reference did not specify th!is 
particular warranty deed at all. There was no specific 
reference to it. True counsel will say (1) the deed (Ex-
hibit D) and the first renewal card bore the same date-
January 12, 1914, (2) both referred to the same amount 
of consideration-$1,400.00, (3) the reference to the 
property on the card is only ''part'' of Section 29, and the 
deed (Exhibit D) covers only part of Section 29, too. 
(But bear in mind the deed is specific, i.e., it describes the 
part covered, the card does not.) This, and that no other 
deed to any land in Section 29 from Lucie R. Thomas and 
husband to Utah Savings has ever been recorded (Tr. 
101) proves, respondents say, that this is the deed which 
was meant for security. 
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Not so. Lucie owned other property in Section 29. 
She owned the 32 ''yellow'' lots so called in the South-
west corner of the West tract. (See map Exhibit A). They 
were claimed for her by respondents at the trial (Tr. 19) 
and the court held they passed to her devisees on her 
death.1 
Now, her yellow lots, all 32 of them, were ''part'' of 
Section 29. They and Northcrest's 33 "white" lots were 
in Capitol Heights second filing which fit into a 30 x 20 
rod corner in the Southwest corner of the West 40 acre 
tract. The deed to Utah Savings did not include that 
20 x 30 rods. It specifically excepted it. (Exhibit D.) 
So it left Lucie her 32 lots in Section 29. The deed 
described a tract which excepted the 20 x 30 rod corner 
like this: 
But not 
this_. 
Lucie deeded to Utah Savings 
this and this 
-. Section 29 -. 
(80R) (80R) 
30R 
Her 32 yellow lots were within the shaded area 
not covered by her deed. 
1The decree awarded both 40 acre tracts (less Northcrest's 33 
stipulated "white" lots) % to John and Gertrude and % to North-
crest as Hugh, Jr.'s grantee. The award had the effect of holding 
mother Lucie died owning the 32 yellow lots. (See map Exhibit A.) 
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The result is that Lucie owned more than just one 
"part" of Section 29. She owned (1) the "part" she 
deeded to the bank by Exhibit D and also (2) the "part" 
she kept. The part contained in the warranty deed re-
ferred to on the loan card without identifying the deed 
itself could well haYe been the yellow lots. A warranty 
deed to them (or part or only some) would satisfy the 
reference to ''part'' of Section 29 scribbled on the cards. 
And that deed might well have never been recorded but 
simply returned when the loan was paid. That hypo-
thesis is equally as compelling as the conclusion that the 
warranty deed and ''part'' were Exhibit B and the 
''part'' described therein. 
Remember, respondents are the ones who are trying 
to prove the mortgage. The deed itself says it is a con-
veyance absolute. Respondents have the burden here, 
not N orthcrest. They had to prove this deed was a mort-
gage; this very deed Exhibit D, itself. N orthcrest didn't 
have to prove anything. And respondents had to prove 
the mortgage by evidence which was clear, unequivocal 
and satisfactory. Coray vs. Roberts, Supra. "Loose and 
random statements or facts and circumstances of doubt-
ful import'' will not suffice. 36 Am. J ur ., Mortgages §134. 
Lucie never made claim that the deed was a mort-
gage. It was made in 1914. She died in 1948. She had 
34 years to make that claim and never did. Had she in-
tended a mortgage, she could have given one. And had 
this deed actually been the deed intended as a mortgage, 
she would have demanded a re-conveyance when she paid 
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the loan. And, likewise, presumably, the bank would have 
re-conveyed. Remember, the rule of law says a deed 
which looks and speaks like a deed is presumed to be a 
deed, and-
'' this presumption is strengthened by lapse 
of time ... and the clearness and weight of evi-
dence (to upset it must be correspondingly in-
creased)". (Parentheses supplied.) 59 C. J. S. 
Mortgages § 48. 
Why should Lucie deed property to the bank out-
right~ N orthcrest cannot be required to furnish a reason. 
The burden is not on it. Respondents must bear the bur-
den of proof. Like McGee, N orthcrest had nothing to do 
with the transaction and knows nothing, of course, about 
it. Nor need the court supply an answer, either. For it 
to hold some other unidentified deed was given as a mort-
gage does not call for explanation why this identified 
deed was given. Perhaps another debt to the bank was 
thereby paid. Who knows~ 
But respondents have failed in their burden of proof. 
The mind is far from clear, the evidence far from un-
equivocal and satisfactory, that this deed and its con-
tents were the actual deed and the actual ''part'' in Sec-
tion 29 referred to in the memorandum on the loan card. 
The evidence was insufficient and the court erred in 
holding this deed was but a mortgage. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH UTAH SAVINGS 
AND TRUST COMPANY (Cont'd.) 
3. The Evidence By Utah Savings And Trust Company 
Attempting To Prove The Deed A Mortgage Was In-
competent After It Had Conveyed To Northcrest. 
"A grantor should not have it in his power 
to deprive his grantee of the property conveyed 
by making statements after the grant.'' 20 Am. 
J ur ., Evidence § 606. 
Sometimes statements of former owners are received 
in evidence as against the title of a grantee. The theory 
is (1) they are admissions against interest, and, (2) 
the grantee being successor in interest is charged with 
the admissions of the former owner. 20 Am. Jur., Evi-
dence §604. 
But, a statement of a grantor to be admissible must 
have been made while he was owner, not afterward. 
"One of the conditions under which the state-
ment of a former owner against his interest is 
admitted in evidence against his successor as an 
admission binding on the latter is that the state-
ment be one made while he had a proprietary 
interest in the property. Accordingly, the declara-
tion of a former owner made before he acquired 
title or after his conveyance of the property ordin-
arily is not admissibue againsh his grantee.'' 20 
Am. Jur., Evidence§ 605. 
''Statements after alienation. Declarations 
of a grantor, made after he has parted with his 
title, are not admissible against his grantee or 
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other persons claiming under the grant. . . . '' 31 
C. J. S. Evidence§ 325. 
The rule has been recognized for over fifty years in 
Utah. Snow vs. Rich, 22 Utah 123, 61 P. 337. 
Utah Savings and Trust Company conveyed to 
Northcrest December 16, 1947. (Exhibit E). That was 
more than three years before the trial in February 1951. 
( Tr. 11). Yet, the bank was allowed to declare at the 
trial by its records and its officer McGee that it once held 
a warranty deed to part of Section 29 as security for a 
loan (an equitable mortgage) to Lucie R. Thomas and 
husband. 
Now, as explained in earlier parts of this brief, the 
security deed mentioned was not shown to be the deed 
in evidence here (Exhibit D) at all; nor was the "part" 
of Section 29 mentioned by the bank's records shown 
to be the ''part'' contained in the specific deed, Exhibit 
D. For these reasons alone, the deed in suit (Exhibit D) 
was not established as a mortage. No ''clear, unequi-
vocal, satisfactory, definite and conclusive" evidence 
thereof-in fact no evidence at all about that deed being 
a mortgage-was given. Coray vs. Roberts, supra, Thorn-
ley Land d!; Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, supra. 
But, regardless of the utter insufficiency thereof, the 
bank's testimony which was aimed at trying to show this 
deed to be a mortgage was incompetent since it consti-
tuted statements by a grantor disparaging its former 
ownership after it had parted with title and conveyed 
to N orthcrest. 
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N orthcrest 's objection was elear. McGee testified 
for respondents that the loan card (Exhibit 8) showed a 
warranty deed had been held for security. He said (Tr. 
64, this Brief l:J) : 
"Apparently, in our security column on this 
liability card, it has 'R. E. Warranty Deed-Part 
of Sec. 29 Tp. 1, No. Range 1 E, S. L. Mer' ''. 
Northcrest thereupon objected: 
".J1:R. THOMAS: At that point. I didn't 
anticipate that coming as quick as it did. I move 
to strike out the witness' answer in regard to the 
alleged security and description, and object to the 
same upon the ground it is incompetent, imma-
terial, irrelevant, and as constituting an attempt 
on the part of the Utah Savings & Trust Company, 
the grantor of this plaintiff, to furnish statements 
and declarations against its ownership, and 
against the title of the plaintiff after the Utah 
Savings & Trust Company has parted with title." 
The court seemed inclined to agree, then wavered 
and overruled the objection (Tr. 65): 
"THE COURT: They did so by Quit Claim 
Deed. That is in evidence. 
''MR. THOMAS: That is right. Exhibit E.'' 
(Argument by counsel.) 
''THE COURT : I am going to let you pro-
ceed Objection overruled.'' 
After further explanation thereof by the bank officer, 
the loan cards (indicating some warranty deed had been 
held for security) were offered. McGee at that point 
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denied knowledge of the transactions himself, saying he 
had not worked for the bank that early. N orthcrest then 
objected but the cards were let in. ( Tr. 54, this Brief 15). 
"MR. THOMAS: I object to them, your 
Honor, as incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant 
and hearsay, and upon the grounds that the pro-
per foundation has not been laid, and also upon 
the grounds they are an attempt on the part of 
the Utah Savings & Trust Company, the grantor 
of this plaintiff, to give evidence in disparage-
ment of its own title to the property in question. 
That is, I assume they are offered for the purpose 
of showing the security transaction of the real 
estate involved here." 
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: That is right." 
"MR. THOMAS: I object to them on those 
grounds.'' 
"THE COURT: Objection overruled, and the 
exhibit will be received." 
Respondents will say that N orthcrest gave nothing 
for the deed (Exhibit E) from Utah Savings to it. But it 
did. A good consideration passed. 
Young Hugh received $3,200.00 from N orthcrest. 
( Tr. 78). When N orthcrest dealt with him its counsel 
found the deed from Lucie to Utah Savings and Trust 
C~mpany recorded and outstanding. (Tr. 76). North-
crest then told Hugh they expected a deed from Utah 
Savings (Tr. 78), that whatever Northcrest paid Hugh 
was to include such a deed; N orthcrest would insist on it. 
That was part of the purchase price. (Tr. 79). This was 
sufficient consideration to support the deed. 
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"From or to Whom the Consideration Must Move. 
-Consideration may move to the promiser or to 
a third person. It may be added that it is not 
essential that the consideration be given by the 
promisee; a consideration mo uing from a third 
person is sufficient." 12 Am. Jur. Contracts~ 76. 
And anyway the rule rejecting statements by a 
grantor after he has conveyed was never related to the 
question of consideration. 
"It has been repeatedly held, without specific 
discussion of the effect of a lack of consideration, 
that the declarations of a donor in disparagement 
of title, made subsequent to the full execution of 
a deed of gift, being mere hearsay, and neither a 
part of the res gestae nor declarations against a 
present interest, are not admissible to defeat the 
completed gift, either against the donee or his 
privies, or in favor of the grantor or others 
claiming under him, it being held incompetent for 
him to affect, or to make evidence in reference to 
the title conferred . . . In fact, the rule has been 
laid down that the law does not recognize that 
derogatory declarations of a grantor, made after 
parting with title, are more likely to be true where 
the transfer was without consideration than where 
the conveyance was based upon a valuable con-
sideration.'' 2 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence 
(2d Ed. ~ 913}. 
But, if no consideration had been present and if 
Utah Savings simply made a gift to Northcrest of the 
deed, the result would be no different. ''Statements by 
grantors of gift deeds may not be received after they 
have parted with their title." 1 A. L. R. 1240. The rule 
applies to gifts of personality, too. Id. 1241. 
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The testimony of Utah Savings and Trust Company 
by its officer aimed at proving they had title only as a 
mortgage was incompetent and erroneously received. It 
was the only evidence upon the subject. The findings and 
judgment based wholly upon that incompetent evidence 
cannot survive but must be set aside. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH 
HUGH L. THOMAS, JR. 
31 
1. The Notary's Testimony Denying Lucie Acknowledged 
The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent. 
'' ... There is a diversity of opinion as to the 
admissibility of testimony of the certifying officer 
to impeach his own certificate, and as to its weight 
if admitted. A majority, perhaps, take the view 
that it is against public policy to allow a public 
officer by oral testimony to undermine his official 
certificate." 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments § 154. 
The office of notary public is of ancient origin, both 
in Roman law and common law as well. It has been known 
to practically all of the Christian nations for centuries. 
39 Am. Jur., Notaries §3. 66 C. J. S. Notaries §1. 
A notary public, as the name implies, is a public 
officer. Id. In Utah notaries are appointed by the Gover-
nor for 4 year terms, must give bond of $500.00 and take 
the "Constitutional Oath". Title 63, U. C. A. Their 
powers are to administer oaths, acknowledge instruments 
of writing, take affidavits and depositions, etc. §63-1-5. 
§78-2-1, U. C. A. A notary must annex his certificate of 
acknowledgement to instruments of conveyance. § 78-2-4. 
And such conveyances may then be recorded in the 
County Recorder's office. §78-3-1. 
Notaries may acknowledge a private writing and 
a notary's certificate thereon is prima facie proof of 
its execution. §104-48-12. §104-25-7, Supp. And every 
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instrument affecting real estate so acknowledged (or the 
record or a certified copy) is received in evidence without 
further proof. §104-48-14. §104-25-13, Supp. 
Here N orthcrest proved another separate chain of 
title. This was (1) a deed from LucieR. Thomas to Hugh 
L. Thomas, Jr. in 1947 (Exhibit B), and, (2) a deed from 
him to Northcrest in 1948 (Exhibit C). This chain as 
limited by the deed from Lucie to Hugh (Exhibit B) 
covered both 40 acre tracts less a strip containing North-
crest's 33 "white" lots and Lucie's 32 "yellow" lots (so 
called) in the Southwest of the West 40 acre tract where 
the "20 x 30 rod" strip is located (but slightly longer). 
See map (Exhibit A). 
Marguerite Clayton is a notary public. She knew 
Lucie R. Thomas for 15 years. (Tr. 57). She was the 
notary who certified to the acknowledgment on the deed 
from Lucie to son, Hugh, September 16, 1947. (Exhibit 
B). Therein, as a public offiicer who had sworn to the 
''Constitutional Oath ... to discharge the duties of my 
office with fidelity" (Constitution of Utah, Article IV, 
§10), she certified as a notary public in her solemn, offi-
cial capacity as such that Lucie acknowledged the deed 
(Exhibit B) before her. And she signed the certificate 
of that acknowledgement in her official capacity as a 
public officer and also affixed here official seal thereto. 
That deed was thus entitled to be recorded, which it was, 
and also to be received (or a certified copy thereof) in 
evidence at this trial (as a copy was) without further 
proof (Exhibit B). But respondents disputed Lucie's 
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signature to the deed and denied that she had actually 
acknowledged it. So they brought the notary to testify. 
err. 57). Over ~ortheret;t 's repeated objections, respond-
ents' counsel and the court both took a hand at question-
ing her and finally wrung from her a simple negative 
"no'' as to whether Lucie actually did appear and ac-
knowledge the deed. ( Tr. 60). The court, being curious 
as to why, then, she had certified to Lucie's acknowledg-
ment, she explained simply "it looked like her signature 
to me. I had seen it." (Tr. 61). 
This notary lied. Either she lied (1) when she 
solemnly certified on the deed that Lucie appeared before 
her and acknowledged the instrument, or, (2) when she 
swore on the witness stand that Lucie did not. She lied 
at one time or the other. She admittedly violated one 
oath or the other, her Constitutional Oath to "discharge 
the duties of her office (as notary) with fidelity" or her 
oath as a sworn witness to tell ''the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth." §104-49-27. §104-24-17, Supp. 
So the case for respondents on the question of 
acknowledgment rests entirely on the infirm testimony 
of the witness who, by her own lips, proved she is not to be 
believed. Evidence like that shows why "a majority 
perhaps, take the view that it is against public policy to 
allow a public officer by oral testimony to undermine his 
official certificate." 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments §154 
supra. 
The authorities are not numerous. But those pro-
hibiting the testimony reason wisely (1) that allowing 
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such evidence is against public policy, (2) that, being 
made at the time of the acknowledgement and being 
the solemn declaration of an officer in his public and offi-
cial capacity under his hand and seal, the certificate is 
more likely to be true than the memory and testimony 
of the witness years afterward, and, (3) persons who have 
dealt and paid in reliance on the truth of the certificate 
should be protected against the contradictory statements 
of the notary made afterward. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledg-
ments. §154. 
Idaho will not allow a notary to testify and renounce 
his certificate. First National Ba;nk vs. Glenn 10 Idaho 
224, 77 p. 623. 
''No notary should be allowed to come into 
court ... and give testimony impeaching his cer-
tiflca te to the mortgage which is being foreclosed 
... The certificate is made at the time of acknow-
ledgment and is the solemn declaration of the 
official in his official capacity as to the truth 
and accuracy of the statements it contains, and 
it is much more likely to be true and correct 
than the memory of the person in years after-
ward ... after persons have relied upon the 
faith and correctness of his official statement, 
and invested their money, and rights have 
grown up thereunder, the person who acknow-
ledged as such official and made such certificate 
should not be heard in a court of justice disputing 
its correctness.'' Id. 
A justice of the peace who takes an acknowledgment 
has not been allowed afterward to impeach his official 
certificate. Woodridge vs. Woodridge (W.Va.) 72 S. E. 
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65-l. And eYen in states where notaries are allowed to 
testify and renounce their certificates, it is agreed that 
their testimony is of little value. 
• • Generally, testimony of the officer tending 
to impeach his certificate is given little weight." 
1 C. J. S. ~\cknowledgments § 142. 
In weighing the testimony of the notary against his 
own certificate, the latter as the New York court points 
out, should be entitled to as much, if not more, weight than 
the officer's testimony, especially after a lapse of 2 years 
(as here). Sparker vs. Sparker 274 N. Y. S. 454. 152 
Misc. 8671 • 
The certificate should be g~ven great weight and 
cannot be lightly overcome. In fact, it has been said 
"that it makes a prima facie case, and that it is equivalent 
to the sworn testimony of one apparently disinterested, 
credible witness." 1 C. J. S. Acknowledgments §141. 
It will not be overthrown by a mere preponderance 
of the evidence. There must be a decided preponderance. 
1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments §155. 
Respondents produced a handwriting expert, J. 
Percy Goddard, and also two other witnesses, Fisher 
1"The certificate is made evidence under the statute. It should, 
therefore, be entitled to as much, if not more, weight than the 
evidence of the officer who executed it, when offered to impeach 
its validity. If courts accept the uncorroborated testimony of 
officers taking acknowledgements to deeds to impeach their 
certificates, titles to real property would indeed be insecure. 
Against the solemn certificate executed by the notary herein, his 
recollection, at this late date (two years after taking acknowledg-
ment) should not prevail." Sparker vs. Sparker. 
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Harris and Vernon W. :Mackay, who said the signature 
to the deed (Exhibit B) was not in Lucie's hand; was 
not written by her. (Tr. 32, 46, 41, 42). Northcrest admits 
that Lucie herself did not write the signature on the deed. 
But a grantor may adopt his signature as written by 
another by acknowledging the deed before a notary. 
Respondents' expert and other witnesses testified only 
that t~e signature was not Lucie's. But that was not 
enough. That goes only to who wrote the signature, not 
to whether Lucie afterward acknowledged the deed as her 
own and thereby adopted the signature thereon. This 
will be discussed presently in the next part of this brief, 
page 37. 
So, on the question of acknowledgment, the notary's 
certificate must be weighed solely against the uncredit-
a ble testimony of the officer who afterward renounced it. 
As seen, it cannot be overcome by her simple renunciation. 
Sparker vs. Sparker, supra. 
It was error by the weight of authority for the 
notary to be permitted to impeach her certificate of 
acknowledgment to the deed (Exhibit B). Furthermore, 
her testimony proved she was not to be believed and so 
her certificate outweighs her testimony to the contrary. 
The ackn~wledgment to the deed survives and the deed 
from Lucie to son, Hugh, must stand. 
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2. Since The Notary's Evidence That Lucie Did Not Ac-
knowledge The Deed To Hugh, Jr. Was Incompetent 
And Insufficient, The Acknowledgement Stands. The 
Deed (Exhibit B) Survives. 
vVe haYe just seen that the majority rule forbids a 
notary to testify and impeach or renounce his certificate 
of acknowledgment on a deed, and even in States where 
he may do so, that such testimony is given "little 
weight", the certificate being entitled to as much, if not 
more, weight than the notary's testimony, especially after 
a lapse of time (2 years) as here. Sparker vs. Sparker 
(N. Y.) supra. 
By the weight of authority, therefore, the trial court 
erred in receiving the incompetent testimony of the 
notary denying Lucie acknowledged the deed (Exhibit 
B) to her son, Hugh. Moreover, that evidence was in-
sufficient, too. 
N orthcrest admits Lucie personally did not sign the 
deed, that she did not write the signature herself. But she 
could have adopted the signature as written by someone 
else by acknowledging the deed before a notary. 
"The fact that the name of the grantor was 
signed by another person is of no importance if 
the instrument was acknowledged in due form.'' 
1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgments§ 23. 
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Remember, a notary does not certify that the grantor 
signed before him, but only that he acknowledged the 
signature as his. 
"The officer does not certify that the signa-
ture was affixed by the grantor. By appearing and 
declaring that the signature is his, the grantor 
recognizes and adopts it as his own.'' Id. 
The rule applies even where forgery is asserted. 
"The rule has been applied where it was 
claimed that the name was a forgery or was 
written without request. 
''A grantor can adopt his name written on 
an instrument by another, where he makes his 
mark as his signature, by making a formal 
acknowledgment of the instrument before an 
officer, although he is able to write his own name. 
''As against any person who without know-
ledge has acted thereon, the grantor is estopped 
to deny that the signature is his." 1 Am. Jur. 
Acknowledgments § 23. 
Where a woman claimed her name was forged, the 
court held her acknowledgment of the deed rendered her 
claim of forgery unimportant. Look: 
''It is of no importance who put her name 
to the deed, so long as it is of record that she 
acknowledged the signature.'' Kerr vs. Russell 
69 Ill. 666, 18 Am. Rep. 634. 
But no claim of forgery was made in our case. All 
respondents proved was that the signature was not in 
Lucie's hand. (Whose hand? Respondents did not say 
and did not prove. Their findings also declined to name 
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the signer.) Proof only that a signature is not in the 
handwriting of a named signer does not establish for-
gery. Even the latter's testimony (1) that he did not 
sign, and, (2) that the signature is not his handwriting, 
is not enough. There must be proof also that the signa-
ture was not authorized. State vs. Jones 81 Utah 503, 20 
P. 2d 614. 
"It is not forgery for one to write another's 
name with authority." Id. 
"To establish falsity it must be made to ap-
pear not only that the person whose name is 
signed to the instrument did not sign it but also 
that his name was signed without authority." Id. 
The rule is: 
''The law ... thinks no evil. Perhaps there 
is no presumption more highly favored in the law 
than the presumption of innocence.'' 1 Jones Com-
mentaries on Evidence, P. 82. 
And, 
''The presumption of innocence is of constant 
application in civil actions . . . (and) where the 
proper issue is involved, the legal presumption 
that men are not guilty of fraud or dishonesty 
and, more strongly, that they do not commit 
criminal offenses, comes into play." Id. P. 88-9. 
As to deeds: 
''One may adopt a deed which has been exe-
cuted in his name by another. He does this by 
acknowledging and delivering such deed as his 
own, and he will not afterwards be allowed to 
deny that the signature is his. This rule obtains 
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in cases where the person's signature is affixed 
without his knowledge.'' 7 Thompson, Real Prop-
erty, § 3881. 
It is clear, therefore, that proof simply that a signa-
ture is not in the hand of the named signer is wholly in-
sufficient. That will not even prove forgery. For the sign-
ing may have been authorized. 
But, although not authorized, the signature may be 
adopted afterward by the true named signer, and, as 
shown, the grantor thereby makes the signature his own. 
Acknowledging the signature to a notary adopts it, as the 
authorities unanimously show. On this, there can be no 
dissent. The postulate is self evident. 
This deed (Exhibit B) was not signed by Lucie her-
self. But, even so, she had a right to acknowledge and 
thereby adopt it and the signature for her own. Mar-
guerite Clayton, notary public, certified that she did. By 
that certificate the deed was proved to be the deed of 
Lucie R. Thomas ''as a conveyance of real property.'' 
§104-48-12. By that certificate the deed was likewise 
"read in evidence ... without further proof." §104-48-14. 
§104-25-13. Supp. 
But the notary now stultifies herself. She would 
now assert the deed was not in fact acknowledged. That 
evidence, contrary to the notary's official certificate on 
the deed, will not be accepted by the weight of authority. 
1 Am. J ur. Acknowledgements §154. But, even where 
received, it is entitled to but little weight. 1 C. J. S. 
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Acknowledgements §142. The certificate is entitled to 
• 'as much, if not more, weight than the officer's testi-
mony,'' Sparker rs. Sparket·, supra; it is even to be count-
ed, as one authority suggests, equivalent to the sworn 
testimony of one apparently disinterested, credible wit-
ness. 1 l~. J. S. Acknowledgments §142. 
The trial court erred. Marguerite Clayton should 
not have been allowed to testify. But when she did, she 
proved she was not worthy of belief for she certified once 
the deed was acknowledged, later swore that it was not. 
Her evidence was wholly contradictory and unworthy of 
belief. Her certificate must stand. Lucie must be taken 
to have acknowledged the deed (Exhibit B) and adopted 
the signature. 
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NORTHCREST'S TITLE THROUGH HEMPSTEADS 
1. N orthcrest Established Title To The West Forty Acre 
Tract Through H. H. Hempstead, Regardless Of Its 
Alternate Titles To Both Tracts. 
As we have shown, the evidence established title in 
Northcrest alternately (1) through Utah Savings & Trust 
Company, and, (2) through Hugh L. Thomas, Jr. Those 
alternate titles related to both 40 acre tracts (less the 
20 x 30 rod corner in the West Tract). 
As stated at the outset (P. 3) when the trial came on 
N orthcrest, by then, was able to trace title back to Lucie 
R. Thomas through those 2 chains. But, it was also able 
to trace back to her through a third chain as well: (3) 
Through H. H. Hempstead on the West 40 acre tract 
alone. It had the right to prove "whatever title it had." 
State vs. Rolio 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987. So, proof of North-
crest's title to the whole aside, it proved alternately, as 
will now be shown, title nevertheless to the West 40 acre 
tract (less the 20 x 30 rods) through Hempstead. This 
title came from Lucie-to-Hempstead-to-Northcrest. We 
will speak of its as the West 40 acres. It is thus: 
80R Section 29 80R 
Lucie deeded 
this to 
H. H. Hempstead 
(West 40 A.) 
30R 
................................................................. ! 
Not This 
(E. 40 A.) 
Not~~ 
this C\l 
"'------t----------·-································-: 
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N orthcrest set up the Hempstead chain by supple-
mental complaint after the action was commenced. It 
alleged (1) that it had owned the West 40 acre tract (less 
20 x 30 rods) when the suit commenced, but, if not, (2) 
that it had since acquired that tract. ( Tr. 8). 
The Hempstead title started with Lucie R. Thomas 
and ran from her to Hempstead to N orthcrest. N orthcrest 
proved the same by the following: 
1. A warranty deed from Lucie R. Thomas 
to H. H. Hempstead December 16, 1908. (Ex-
hibit F). 
2. A deed from Lucy S. Hempstead (Hemp-
steads widow, sole heir and devisee) to N orthcrest 
November 29, 1950. (Exhibit G.) 
3. A Salt Lake County District Court Decree 
by Northcrest against Hempstead's administrator 
(and also his widow) quieting N orthcrest 's title 
January 26, 1951. (Exhibit H.) 
So, it is plain that regardless of N orthcrest 's two 
other alternate chains to the whole, it proved title to the 
West half (West 40 acres) at least, through the Hemp-
steads. The documents were not disputed. Respondents 
objected only that they were ''not within the issues of this 
case". (Tr. 24). The court found, as it was bound to do 
on the record, ( 1) that the deed from Lucie R. Thomas to 
Hempstead was made and recorded, Tr. 108, (2) that 
Hempstead's widow conveyed to Northcrest, and, (3) 
that Northcrest quieted title against Hempstead's admin-
istrator and widow. (Tr. 109). But the court stopped 
there. It totally ignored the effect of those findings, it 
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found nothing as a fact and concluded nothing as a matter 
of law to avoid their result. The court explained futilely 
in an earlier finding that N orthcrest and Hugh, Jr. had 
thought ("agreed" was the word used) that Lucie's deed 
to Hempstead was ''no more than a cloud'' which ought 
to be removed. ( Tr. 108). 
But Northcrest's and Hugh's "agreed" thoughts 
about his mother's deed to Hempstead could not alter 
its legal effect one whit. That is too plain for argument. 
That is was a deed from Lucie to Hempstead is not denied 
and was specifically found as stated by the court in find-
ings prepared and submitted by respondents. And that 
this deed conveyed title to Hempstead is undeniable, too. 
The deed to N orthcrest from Hempstead's widow, sole 
heir and devisee is not disputed either. It was found to 
have been made and given, as was also Northcrest's quiet 
title decree against Hempstead's administrator and his 
widow. (Tr. 108, 109). 
So, N orthcrest proved and the court found upon the 
Hempstead title exactly as we stated: (1) a deed from 
Lucie R. Thomas to Hempstead, and, (2) a deed from 
Hempstead's widow, sole heir and devisee to N orthcrest. 
Those two deeds proved N orthcrest 's title without more. 
But the proof and findings added more, i.e., (3) a decree 
by Northcrest against Hempstead's administrator (and 
his widow) besides. The effect of these documents is not 
to be denied. They effectively vested title in N orthcrest. 
It will not do for the trial court to explain, as it did, 
that N orthcrest and Hugh thought the Hempstead deed 
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was no more than a cloud. That is only an exposition of 
a misplaced thought. It will not avoid the legal effect 
of the deed. Neither will the fact that Northcrest was 
so fortunate as to be wrong about it at the time! So, when 
X orthcrest acquired Hempstead's title-as it had a right 
to do-it acquired the property. 
The court erred. The West 40 acre tract (less 20 x 
30 rods) was N orthcrest 's and should have been so ad-
judged irrespective of N orthcrest 's title as otherwise 
alternately claimed and established to both 40 acre tracts. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lucie R. Thomas was the former owner of the prop-
erty in suit. But Northcrest traced title back to her by 
3 alternate chains: To the two 40 acre tracts, (1) through 
Utah Savings and Trust Company, and, (2) through her 
son, Hugh, and, ( 3) to the West 40 acre tract through 
H. H. Hempstead as well. 
The 33 "white" lots (within the 20 x 30 rods) were 
stipulated and adjudged to be Northcrest's. But the rest 
of the two 40 acre tracts (including the other 32 "yellow" 
lots) were adjudged never to have been conveyed by 
Lucie in her lifetime and to have passed by will upon her 
death to her three children, John, New York; Gertrude, 
Virgin Islands; and Hugh, Jr., Salt Lake City. Since 
Hugh afterward conveyed to Northcrest, only the Y3 
share said to have reached him on his mother's death 
was adjudged to have passed to Northcrest, no more. But 
upon this record, that was error. The whole of the prop-
erty should have been adjudged as N orthcrest 's except 
the 32 "yellow" lots (within the 20 x 30 rods) which 
were properly awarded Y3 to Northcrest and ~ to John 
and Gertrude. 
Appellant submits: 
1. The evidence failed to establish the warranty 
deed from Lucie R. Thomas to Utah Savings and Trust 
Company(Exhibit D) was )nly a mortgage. Intention 
rules; intention of both parties, grantor and grantee. 
McGee, the bank's officer, was the only witness on this 
point. The grantee's intention aside, there was no evi-
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dence at all upon the intention of the grantors; none 
whatever. .\nd there was no proof that the warranty 
deed referred to in the bank's old records was in fact 
the deed here. (Exhibit D). 
~- The evidence was insufficient altogether to esta-
blish the deed (Exhibit D) to be a mortgage. A deed 
absolute is presumed to be just that; a conveyance, not a 
mortgage. .-\ party asserting a deed is a mortgage has 
the burden of proof. More than a preponderance is re-
quired. The evidence must be "clear, definite, unequi-
vocal and conclusive.'' Thornley L. L. Co. vs. Gailey 
105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 283. 1 It must not leave the 
transaction in reasonable doubt. 36 Am. Jur. Mort-
gages §135. But the evidence offered here was simply 
a reference on the bank's loan card (Exhibit 8) 
to a warranty deed to part of Section 29, no 
more. What deed and what part was not specified. Lucie, 
remember, also owned the 32 "yellow" lots in Section 29. 
So she owned more than one part in that Section. A deed 
to the 32 lots-or only some of them-would have satis-
fied the reference to "part" of Section 29 Respondents 
had the burden. That burden required them to prove this 
very deed itself (Exhibit D) not just some deed was in-
tended as a mortgage. But they failed. Lucie herself had 
34 years to claim the deed was but a mortgage and to 
demand a re-conveyance. But she did not. The presump-
tion that a deed absolute is a conveyance is strengthened 
by lapse of time. 59 C. J. S. Mortgages §48. It grows 
1To same effect see Pender vs. Anderson (Utah) just decided and 
contained in the Pacific Reporter advance sheet October 5, 1951, 
235 p 2d 360. 
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and grows. It had surely outgrown respondents' feeble 
proof long ago. 
3. The evidence by Utah Savings and Trust Com-
pany through its officer, McGee, aimed at proving the 
deed, (Exhibit D) to be a mortgage, was incompetent. 
Statements of a grantor made, as here, after parting 
with title are not admissible to disparage the grantor's 
former ownership. The rule appli~s without regard to 
consideration, even in cases of gift. N orthcrest paid a 
consideration to Hugh, Jr. for a deed from Utah Savings. 
Consideration may always move between third parties. 
But if it couldn't, and if Utah Savings had made an out-
right gift of its deed (Exhibit E) to N orthcrest, the re-
sult is no different. The rule prevents grantors from 
belittling their former titles after they have conveyed, 
consideration or no consideration. 
4. The notary's testimony denying Lucie acknow-
ledged the deed to her son Hugh (Exhibit B) was by the 
weight of authority incompetent. 1 Am. Jur. Acknow-
ledgments ~154. But, if this court is to uphold the trial 
court in the opposite view, the testimony was insufficient. 
In States where the notary is allowed to renounce his 
certificate his testimony is entitled to but "little weight". 
1 C. J. S. Acknowledgements ~142. On the other hand, the 
certificate should be given great weight and cannot be 
lightly overcome. Id. ~141. A mere preponderance will 
not suffice. 1 Am. Jur. Acknowledgements ~155. This 
notary once certified Lucie acknowledged the deed; later 
swore she did not. She is not to be believed. Her certifi-
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rate is entitled to as much, if not more, weight than her 
simple testimony to the contrary, especially after a lapse 
of ~ years' time, as here. Sparker cs. Sparker, supra. 
5. Since the notary's evidence \Vas incompetent and 
also insufficient, the acknowledgment stands and Lucie's 
deed to her son, Hugh, (Exhibit B) survives. Although 
the signature was not signed by her personally, the 
acknowledgment of the deed adopted, the signature as al-
ready written thereon. Proof only that Lucie did not sign 
does not destroy the deed. Her acknowledgment certified 
on the deed makes the signature her adopted one. 
6. Were all else to fail, N orthcrest 's title through 
H. H. Hempstead is good. The deed from Lucie to Hemp-
stead, the deed from Hompstead 's widow to N orthcrest, 
and Northcrest's quiet title decree against Hempstead's 
administrator and his widow, are not denied. They are 
proved and are firmly established by the court's findings. 
Yet, because the court explained that N orthcrest and 
Hugh thought Hempstead's deed was only a cloud, it 
denied the legal effect thereof as a conveyance. But 
thinking will not make a deed a cloud. Respondents can-
not deny N orthcrest 's right to be so fortunate as to have 
been wrong in that particular. The deed was a deed, not 
a cloud. The cloud, for respondents, has vanished. The 
Hempstead title which thus passed to N orthcrest covered 
the West 40 acres (less 20 x 30 rods). See Sketch Page 42. 
7. The court properly adjudged to Northcrest the 
stipulated 33 "white" lots in the 20 x 30 rod strip. It 
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also properly adjudged to Northcrest a one-third in 
terest in Lucie's 32 "yellow" lots which she had not con 
veyed and which passed to Hugh by Lucie's will and wen 
to N orthcrest under Hugh's deed to it of all the property 
(Exhibit C.) But, it should have adjudged the rest of th~ 
property to Northcrest, too. But it did not. It gave North 
crest only Y3 thereof and gave ¥3 to John an( 
Gertrude. This was error. The judgment must hE 
reversed with directions to enter judgment for North-
crest to all of the property and quieting its title thereto: 
except the undivided two-thirds of the "yellow lots': 
which passed to John and Gertrude by Lucie's will; and 
for costs. 
October, 1951. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Northcrest, Inc. 
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